It appears that the warm cyclone that melted the ice of US-Ukraine relations has also warmed considerably Kyiv's relations with NATO after the biting frost of the "Kolchuga" scandal and the icy acrimony of the Prague summit.

This conclusion could be drawn from last Monday's high-level NATO-Ukraine consultations on issues of defense and security in Washington, DC, according to Tatiana Salina, Washington, D.C. in her feature article published by the weekly Zerkalo Nedeli On The WEB, Mirror Weekly, Kyiv, Ukraine on Sunday, May 11, 2003.

Out of the Dark into the Light

It was the second meeting at such a level in the history of NATO-Ukraine relations. During the first meeting, organized in March last year by the Espin Institute in Berlin, Ukraine's delegation announced its bid for membership in NATO. The stunned NATO representatives rejected point blank that sudden demand.

Nevertheless, at its meeting on May 23 last year, chaired by President Leonid Kuchma, the National Security and Defense Council passed a landmark resolution, setting a new goal before the nation - fully-fledged membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Kyiv also managed to find convincing arguments for its partners which unlocked the door to the Prague summit. And although the "Kolchuga" scandal was in full swing at that time, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and the Target Plan for 2003 were signed in Prague.

Six months have passed since then, and four months of reportedly intense work on those documents in Kyiv. However, top Ukrainian officials admit that the Prague summit was followed by a lull in relations with the Alliance. There was even some apprehension lest Brussels view the Prague documents as nothing but a unilateral circumstantial move on the part of Kyiv. There was also NATO Secretary General George Robertson's letter to Ukraine's Premier Yanukovych which expressed concern about Kyiv's commitments being halted.

However, Ukrainian top officials claim they have, generally, managed to catch up with the timetables of the Action Plan and the Target Plan. The formal pretext for the Washington consultations was the need to assess Ukraine's progress in its Euro-Atlantic efforts and NATO's additional assistance. The consultations were organized by a non-governmental US organization - the Center for Strategic and International Studies. On the eve, the US National Aerospace Museum held a reception for 350. Even high-ranking and experienced American experts noted that it was the first time in many years that so many defense and security experts were together in one place (and it was for a first time in the history of NATO-Ukraine relations), which testified to a great interest in the NATO-Ukraine issue.

Ukraine's delegation was led by NSDC Secretary Yevhen Marchuk and included Defense Minister Volodymyr Shkidchenko, State Border Committee Chairman Mykola Lytvyn, Parliament Vice Speaker Alexander Zinchenko, Foreign Ministry State Secretary Anatoliy Orel, National Euro-Atlantic Integration Center Director Vladimir Gorbulin, NSDC Deputy Secretary Sergey Pirozhkov, Ambassador to the USA Kostiantyn Gryshchenko, Head of Ukraine's Mission to NATO Volodymyr Handogiy, Razumkov Center President Anatoliy Gritsenko. Gritsenko, a representative of a non-governmental organization, was included in Ukraine's official delegation for the second time, and that fact was praised by the partner delegations.

The Alliance was represented by Secretary General Lord Robertson, the defense ministers (or their deputies) of all member countries, including Pentagon Chief Donald Rumsfeld, whose report was on the same subject as Marchuk's, and representatives of the even candidate countries.

The consultations in the Ronald Reagan Building were held behind tightly closed doors. There was no admittance to reporters and even to the aides and experts accompanying their delegations. But, as could be gathered from some participants' scarce remarks, NATO showed a very positive and interested attitude to Ukraine, although, according to Marchuk, the Western partners were sometimes "bitterly outspoken". Many of them supported Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and some even praised it in advance.

Many guests at the reception noted Robertson's phrase "a democratic Ukraine among us". Opening the consultations, he said, "It's no secret that our relations have been through a rather difficult year. Fortunately, much of that uncertainty has receded because the Ukrainian Government has made a determined effort to push ahead with its drive to Euro-Atlantic integration." And at the follow-up news conference, replying to the direct question: "Has the "Kolchuga" problem been removed from the NATO-Ukraine agenda?" Robertson said very definitely: "The worst problem in our relations is over. But there are some other problems, and they need to be solved." Addressing the participants in the consultations, Robertson also said that the defense reform "remains a critical element" in the general process of Ukraine's integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. According to him, thanks to the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group For Defense Reform, "substantial progress" has been achieved in making Ukraine's defense planning more transparent and in increasing democratic civil control over the military. He also noted "inspiring" progress in attaining greater operational compatibility between the armed forces of Ukraine and those of the NATO members.

According to Yevhen Marchuk who headed the Ukrainian delegation, the consultations addressed four principal issues:
- NATO's and Ukraine's contribution to strengthening peace and security;
- - the implementation of defense and security aspects of the Action Plan;
- - the reformation of Ukraine's Defense Ministry and Armed Forces;
- - the post-reform regulation.

The main reports on these issues were presented on the Ukrainian side by Marchuk, Gorbulin, Shkidchenko, Zinchenko. All-in-all, participants in the consultations took the floor more than thirty times.

Ukraine's successes and failures in implementing the Action Plan and the Target Plan were analyzed by the NATO and DOD leaderships (former and active), particularly Rumsfeld and Cohen, as well as representatives of other NATO members.

Some of the participants (not Ukrainians!) even suggested setting a definite term for Ukraine's accession to NATO. But in reply to the question whether NATO could accept Ukraine before 2005 Robertson said that Ukraine has not applied for membership, and that the issue of accepting new members is not on the agenda, since the seven recently invited countries have to become NATO members first.

When Marchuk was asked when Ukraine is going to officially apply for membership, he gave a very detailed reply. "Before we can do it, we have to complete the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and the Target Plan. The next step will be the Membership Action Plan and an intensified dialogue. We will have to complete all the necessary national procedures, reach a consensus within our country and secure at least 51% of popular support. Then there will be a series of other procedures. On the whole, it is a very long way."

The ZN asked the same question of Anatoliy Gritsenko. "In my opinion, it makes little sense discussing the practical side of this issue or trying to set tentative terms before the 2004 presidential elections. We can't get a serious answer from NATO till then. The main reason is that the Target Plan and the very idea of joining NATO imply two fundamental components: the common values that we are supposed to accept and the defense of these values from various threats, particularly by military means. And if our readiness for membership in NATO were assessed as our readiness to defend these values, we could say that Ukraine has made serious progress, that the military component of our cooperation has been the most stable over the eight years of our cooperation in the framework of the Partnership for Peace program. We have already covered three difficult stages of attaining operational compatibility. We have participated in joint peacekeeping operations, the aircraft of the anti-terrorism coalition have used our airspace, we have exchanged intelligence information, signed a number of important documents, established personal contacts, made visible headways in defense reform etc.

So if our membership depended exclusively on the military component, I think we could talk about joining NATO in three or five years after the relevant procedure is launched. But since NATO is not so much a defender of democratic values as the values per se - a transparent market economy, normal business environments for all (not corrupt authorities), protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms, free democratic elections etc., that's where we have the most serious problems. During the consultations I proposed that at the next meeting in Poland next year we consider together the non-military aspects of the Target Plan, specifically with regard to the observance of civil rights and freedoms. And I proposed that the main reports on the Ukrainian side be presented not only by government officials, but also by representatives of interested public organizations, in order to have a complete picture. Otherwise, there would be inadequate "self-reports" distorting the real situation."

"Not to Miss the Opportunity"

Although the issue of Ukraine's membership was not specifically discussed during the Washington consultations, it is obvious that just now Ukraine has a very serious chance to move closer to NATO. The United States, its allies in the anti-Saddam coalition and other interested parties are going to form a stabilization force in Iraq, in which Ukraine's participation is welcome.

On April 30, a Ukrainian delegation attended, as an observer, a consultative meeting of the anti-Iraq coalition countries in London. (Only three or four more countries were invited in the observer status). The participants discussed in every detail the issue of Iraq's post-war stabilization.

Iraq's territory is most likely to be divided into three or four sectors. Two sectors are supposed to be under US and British control, and one more is likely to be controlled by Australia. Poland is almost ready to take control of the fourth sector (a final decision is expected to be made at a special conference in Warsaw on May 21-22). The boundaries of the "Polish" sector have yet to be determined. Tentatively, it is going to be in the Kurdish northern part of Iraq. That region is rather "difficult", and the troops deployed there would have to operate in a very complex and conflict-explosive environment. Therefore, it is planned to deploy not just peacekeeping contingents but a mobile rifle division in each sector. The mission is supposed to be not only peacekeeping, but also forcible peacemaking.

Further, the stabilization forces are supposed to restore the management, communications and other systems. Besides, it is urgently necessary to form bodies of central and local government on a democratic basis, write a constitution and new laws, hold elections. In other words, Iraq needs to be assisted in the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. Obviously, this process is going to be long and difficult, and no one ventures to predict how long Iraq will need the presence of foreign troops or when they will be replaced by its own police.

Nevertheless, Poland is almost ready to manage one of the sectors. According to Polish sources, Warsaw's plans envisage a 7,000-strong division, which should better be classed as a reinforced brigade. As the Polish Defense Minister stated recently, Poland is ready to send between 1,500 and 2,000 troops, inviting German and. Ukrainian units. According to sources close to the Ministry, it would be desirable that Ukraine furnish at least a brigade staff and two battalions, or better a full mechanized brigade.

As can be gathered from conversations with some Ukrainian top officials, such plans don't look very inspiring. Not because Ukraine turns down the idea of participating in the stabilization force. Experts insist that Ukraine's combat potential is head and shoulders above Poland's, although the latter is a NATO member.

It is absolutely clear that the United States is extremely interested in Ukraine's large-scale participation in the stabilization force in Iraq.

And Ukraine is again on the horns of a dilemma. The choice is very difficult. Firstly, it's quite clear that in the case of a positive political decision, the mission of the Ukrainian troops would not be to plant oases but to keep the peace, which may well involve casualties. So Ukrainian political leaders cannot close their eyes to such a risk.

Secondly, the deployment of troops in Iraq would require substantial expense which this country can't afford. Neither can Poland, which complains about its stagnant economy and hints that the Americans should back up its mission financially.

Thirdly, one shouldn't forget about public opinion. The majority of Ukrainians condemned the US-led intervention from the start, and opposed the dispatch of the Ukrainian chemical defense battalion to Kuwait. It's clear that making unpopular decisions, politicians risk both their popularity now and their careers in the future.

However, even the most democratically-minded experts admit that public opinion should not necessarily be dominant when important political decisions are made. (They cite the example of the Spanish Prime Minister who said after Spain joined the anti-Hussein coalition: he knows that many Spanish citizens are against that step. But the government was elected democratically in a democratic country, and the people delegated to it the authority to rule the country and make decisions, and that's what the government is doing.)

And the fourth, very serious obstacle to Ukraine's participation in the stabilization force in Iraq is its legislation, under which Ukrainian military contingents may be deployed abroad exclusively with a UN mandate or if invited by a foreign nation's government and under a relevant bilateral agreement. The problem is, Iraq has no government and there is no one to send an invitation (although some kind of interim administration might be formed soon). As far as the UN mandate is concerned, even America's allies, including Great Britain, want the situation in Iraq to be put in a legal framework and settled through UN mediation. Even the United States, having done the hardest and dirtiest job of toppling Saddam Hussein's regime, is now not so categorically against inviting a United Nations that never blessed the anti-Iraq coalition. Condoleeza Ryce [Rice] , the Adviser on National Security, told the members of the Ukrainian delegation about the United States' intention to do everything possible to get a relevant resolution adopted by the UN Security Council. She articulated Washington's earnest interest in the "significant participation" of Ukrainian military specialists in forming an allied stabilization force in Iraq.

Such an interest is dictated primarily by the wish to demonstrate the multinational character of the stabilization force. America will certainly close its eyes to many dubious things that are happening in Ukraine, and many opponents of the Kuchma regime should be prepared for that. At the same time, Condoleeza Ryce stated clearly that there are prerequisites for deepening and developing US-Ukraine relations, but on one condition: transparent and democratic presidential elections in 2004. She placed special emphasis on the date. It should be noted in this connection that Leonid Kuchma spent a week in Crimea looking for ways to change 2004 for 2006. He spent long hours negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Apparently, Russia has its own point of view on the participation of Ukrainian troops in the stabilization force in Iraq. Kuchma's meeting with Bush is not in sight: Mrs. Ryce [Rice]didn't convey Mr. Bush's invitation to the Ukrainian delegation. A UN mandate would reduce Ukraine's political risks, both inside and outside the country. The level of dividends would be lower, though: stakes and prizes are higher in secret gambling than in legal games. It's just like interest rates on bank deposits: in stable Switzerland they are far lower than in the Dominican Republic. But the government is a subject of political management whose task is constant search for an optimal balance between dividends and legality.

Another option for legitimizing the stabilization force in Iraq could be an operation like the one in Kosovo, where the responsibility would be assumed by NATO.

But France's rigid position, Germany's negative stance and some other NATO members' silent disapproval leave no hope for NATO as an instrument. As Robertson stated at the Monday press conference, so far NATO has no official position at all with regard to the situation in Iraq. Last month this issue was discussed by the foreign ministers of the member countries, and some ministers suggested that NATO could play a certain role in Iraq when the situation cleared up. According to another source within the Alliance, NATO is very unlikely to revert to this issue before this autumn. But the stabilization force has to be deployed urgently - in early summer. And Ukraine also must to make up its mind by that time.

According to some sources, a number of leading US experts who have real influence on decision-making and even some American politicians give Ukraine to understand that it has a unique chance, similar to the one that was fully used by the then candidate (now invited) countries in Kosovo when they offered their territories to NATO bases and rendered the Alliance maximum assistance.

American experts emphasize that there may never be another chance like this. Now the Ukrainian contingent in the Persian Gulf zone is the fourth largest after the US, British and Australian ones. And American sources say that if it remains in the number of the largest contingents and is able to cope with its tasks, thus demonstrating its combat and language skills and compatibility with NATO units - for which so much money has been spent, then Ukraine's membership in NATO could be discussed. Of course, no one gives or is going to give a hundred percent guarantee, but we shouldn't forget that the United States is the most influential power in the world and that it knows how to achieve what it wants.

So Kyiv has to consider this chance - probably, the most serious in all its years of independence - of real rapprochement with NATO and of occupying an advantageous position within the rapidly forming new system of international relationships.

And it should be taken into account that the issue of legitimacy or illegitimacy of US actions is no longer on the agenda. The military operation has been completed, and very successfully, too. Now there is a possibility to establish a relatively democratic regime and normal living conditions in Iraq. And Ukraine could play its role in this process. Yes, its legislation formally prohibits that. But the legislation could be amended. The American experts and politicians put it like this: the willing look for ways, the unwilling look for reasons. Ukraine must adopt a political decision. This issue has already been discussed with the President, and he reportedly expressed his "understanding of the problem".

If the top political leadership displays a strong political will and explains chearly to the lawmakers and the rest of the nation the importance of Euro-Atlantic integration and acceptance of NATO values (which would help to solve a lot of domestic problems), the decision on Ukraine's participation in the stabilization force in Iraq can collect enough votes in Parliament.

It's quite possible that while the policy-makers discuss options and future decisions, the military are girding up their loins and loading their guns on the QT (as happened when the chemical defense battalion was going to be sent to Kuwait).

The final decision (particularly in the juridical aspect) will show whether a strong political will for Euro-Atlantic integration does exist in this country.

Kuchma displayed it when he went to Prague. Many accused him of discrediting Ukraine's image again and laughed heartily at the clever trick with the French alphabet [the seats at the NATO summit round table were rearranged according to the French alphabet so that Kuchma (Ukraine) was not seated between Blair (UK) and Bush (USA)]. And a couple of months later, one man who has admittance to the Pentagon corridors told your author about his conversation with a US Army brass hat who said something like "You know, we believed that Ukraine really wants to join NATO only when we saw what colossal humiliation Kuchma was ready to stand in Prague."

But even believing, they are not going to drag us into NATO. There is simply a proposal lying on our table. We may accept or reject it. But we must remember that this is the most serious proposal in the history of our relations with the USA and NATO.

Anatoliy Gritsenko stressed that a positive decision on participating in the stabilization force in Iraq would give a dynamic impetus to Ukraine's movement toward NATO and make the issue of its future membership practicable. Ukraine could demonstrate how far it has progressed with reforming its armed forces, how well it is able to perform jointly with other armies. It could prove that it is becoming an active player in the international arena, largely owing to and through its cooperation with NATO.

The Ukrainian expert believes that a positive decision would demonstrate Ukraine's adherence to its strategic partnership with the United States, the country that did much to help Ukraine at the beginning of independence, the country whose word was decisive in lifting the FATF sanctions, the country that actively supports Ukraine's WTO membership bid and so on and so forth. Ukraine could demonstrate that in hard times it can be a dependable and predictable partner.

That is a sine qua non, but not a sufficient condition for Ukraine's real advance toward NATO. According to Gritsenko, we may send a whole division to Iraq, but if the President breaks his promise of fair and transparent elections, if administrative pressure is applied again, as it was at the 2002 parliamentary elections, no peacekeeping operation will help Ukraine, and its membership in NATO will remain purely theoretical for years to come, according to Tatiana Salina, Washington, D.C. in her feature article published by the weekly Zerkalo Nedeli On The WEB, Mirror Weekly, Kyiv, Ukraine on Sunday, May 11, 2003.

The feature article on U.S.-Ukraine relations was monitored by the Ukraine Market Reform Group (UMRG) and the www.ArtUkraine.com Information Service (ARTUIS) in Kyiv, Ukraine and Washington, D.C.